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Abstract 
 
The main goal of this paper is to evaluate the impact of governance on economic growth 
using a group of 188 countries. Although our main focus is on the 21 Middle Eastern and 
North African (MENA) countries, our findings can be applied to the other countries as 
well.  We create a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing six 
governance measurements in the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using the 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA) method. The first principal component derived 
from the WGIs explains as much as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI 
measurements.   We then use PPP adjusted constant per capita GDP data to find that per 
capita GDP would rise by about 2% if the CGI increases by one unit. Using the Rule of 
70, the marginal estimate further indicates a mere five-unit improvement in CGI would 
double the country’s per capita GDP in seven years. Nonetheless, the effect of 
improvement of governance cannot account for the higher than expected per capita GDP 
in most of the oil rich MENA countries. In other words, the majority of the MENA 
countries have achieved fragile levels of economic growth that does not depend on sound 
governance.   
 
I. Introduction 
 
There is no doubt that improving the business climate is a major factor for attracting both 
national and international investors to a country, which would ultimately be reflected in 
increasing economic growth. Investors will drive away from a politically unstable, 
bureaucratic, and highly corrupted economies with inefficient and nontransparent 
government services. A government that is socially accountable in delivering services 
and responsive to the needs of its citizens will ultimately create a democratic 
environment leading to inclusive growth and human development. 
The slow growth performances in many developing countries, especially Middle 
East and North African (MENA) countries, have been disappointing over the last decade. 
Since the second half of the 1980’s, growth and development studies have started to shed 
the light on the importance of improving institutions of governance on economic growth. 
The studies of Owens (1987) and Sen (1999) show that economic and political stability 
has a statistical significant impact on economic growth and development.  
Many scholars and researchers have confirmed the positive link of improved 
quality of governance on economic growth. The study of Knack and Keefer (1997) shows 
that both property rights and contract enforcement have positive impact on economic 
growth. Similarly, Campos and Nugent (1999) prove a statistically significant positive 
impact of governance on economic development. The work of Kaufmann, et al. (1999a 
and 1999b) reaches the same conclusion about the importance of governance to economic 
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development. Similar findings are reached in the work of Knack and Keefer (1995) and 
Mauro (1995).  
Much research work conducted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
United Nations, and the World Bank shows that good governance leads to economic 
growth. For instance, Kaufman and Kraay (2002) evaluated the World Governance 
Indicators over the period 1996 to 2002 and found a positive relationship between per 
capita income and quality of governance.  
One of the leading studies in the literature on institutions and their effect on 
economic performance was written by Acemoglu, et al. (2000). The paper shows that 
differences in economic performance among nations can be attributed to the difference in 
institutions.  Acemoglu, et al. found that different colonization strategies have led to 
different types of institutions that remain today. Colonies with low mortality rates had 
higher European settlements and accordingly stronger institutions were built which 
ultimately explains differences between countries in terms of current performance. 
Furthermore, the work of Acemoglu, et al. (2005b) concludes that differences between 
countries in terms of income and economic development are explained by differences in 
institutions. Within the same lines, Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) show that differences 
in economic prosperity among nations can be explained by differences in political 
institutions. Their paper provides policy recommendations that suggest reforming 
institutions would help in poverty alleviation. Additionally, the work of Chauvet and 
Collier (2004) finds that developing countries with poor quality of governance will lead 
to less economic growth. And within the same lines, the cross sectional of study by 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) compares adjacent cities along the United States-Mexico 
border. They reach the conclusion that political and economic institutions underlie 
economic success and the degree of incentive structures and the state-market relationship 
is the determinant factor of cities’ growth performance.  
Given the previous background, the research on the link between governance and 
economic growth for the MENA region is relatively very thin. The World Bank’s World 
Governance Indicator project shows that the MENA region always ranks below the 
average of the sample. This World Bank project seeks to measure the quality of 
governance in a particular nation using six metrics: voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of 
corruption. These metrics are measured both by a governance score that ranges from -2.5 
to +2.5, and a percentile rank relative to nations worldwide. 
The study of Leenders and Sfakianakis (2002) shows that the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index for Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia and 
Libya is below the global median in terms of levels of public sector corruption. Similarly, 
the World Bank (2003) study shows that the MENA countries perform lower than 
countries with similar incomes and characteristics. In addition, Chêne (2008) shows that 
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based on the World Bank Governance Indicators, MENA countries perform above 
average in political stability, rule of law, and quality of administration, however, it 
performs below average for the transparency, voice accountability, and control of 
corruption.  
Within the same lines, Han, X., Khan, H., and Zhuang, J. (2014) analyzes the 
governance gap and its effect on economic growth. Among many other results, the study 
shows that “Middle East and North African countries with a surplus in political stability, 
government effectiveness, and corruption control are observed to grow faster than those 
with a deficit in these indicators by as much as 2.5 percentage points annually.” The 
study implies that governance matters to economic growth in the MENA region. 
Furthermore, Mehanna, Yazbeck, and Sarieddine (2010) study the relationship 
between governance and economic development in 23 MENA countries over the period 
1996-2005. Their study compares different challenges facing the region including 
education, fixed investment, presence of religious fractionalization, and governance. The 
study shows that improving governance is the main challenge facing the MENA 
countries. The study shows that voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and 
control of corruption exert the strongest economic impact on economic development. 
Additionally, Emara, N. and Jhonsa (2014) shows that despite the low 
performance of most of MENA countries on almost all the six measures of World Bank 
Governance Indicators, their estimated levels per capita of income are relatively higher 
than the rest of the countries in the sample. This study concludes that most of these 
countries have achieved relatively high but fragile standard of living that is not based on 
sound governance.  
According to the latest available World Governance Indicator data for the voice 
and accountability metric, shows that 16 of the Middle East and North Africa region’s 21 
largest countries by population were given a negative governance score and ranked in the 
38th percentile or lower. For the political stability metric, 15 out of 21 were given a 
negative score and ranked in the 36th percentile or lower. For the government 
effectiveness metric, 12 out of 21 nations had negative scores, and 3 out of 21 ranked 
below the 25th percentile. For regulatory quality, 15 out of 21 had negative scores, and 6 
out of 21 again ranked below the 25th percentile. For rule of law, 11 out of 21 had 
negative scores, and 4 out of 21 ranked below the 25th percentile. And for control of 
corruption, negative scores were given to 13 out of 21 nations, with 4 out of 21 ranking 
below the 25th percentile. 
Despite the MENA governments’ effort to enhance the level of governance, the 
World Bank’s Governance Indicators show no significant change across all indicators, 
namely rule of law, control of corruption, government effectiveness, voice and 
accountability and regulatory quality for the MENA region over the period between 2007 
and 2014. Of course looking at the MENA governance indicators, one can tell that the 
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performance between these countries has been non-uniform. Countries such as Bahrain, 
Cyprus, Israel, Oman, Turkey, and United Arab Emirates have performed relatively 
better than the rest of the MENA countries. And with no doubt, given the recent political 
instability in Syria, the data shows that Syria is the worst of the list of the MENA 
countries in terms of all governance indicators. The data shows that Yemen and Iraq are 
following Syria in terms of low levels of governance quality especially for the political 
stability index. 
The Open Budget Index of 2015 2 , which reflects governments’ social 
accountability, shows that Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, and Algeria have 
recorded the lowest levels with a score of “scant or none (0-20)”. Furthermore, freedom 
of the citizens to express their opinions in political matters and the freedom of the press 
has been highly restricted in countries such as Egypt, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. As Pintak, 
L. (2011) wrote about the Arab media’s poor standard of delivering services to its 
citizens, “A free media is not necessarily a credible media.” So it’s not only a matter of 
freedom, but it is also a matter of credibility.   
In general, the extent to which citizens of the MENA region have confidence in 
and abide by the rules of society have been generally very weak. The rule of law index is 
relatively the worst for Iraq, Syria, and Yemen with an average of -1.29. Furthermore, 
what makes matters worse for a countries with relatively strong legal framework such as 
Egypt (score -0.60) is the problem of implementing such legislations. This means that the 
problem of governance is not only about its existence but more importantly about the 
mechanism through which it can be implemented to positively affect the society.  
Additionally, countries such as Egypt, Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen 
suffer from relatively high levels of corruption with an average index of -1.02. Some of 
these countries have taken steps to fight corruption but still more efforts need to be done. 
For instance, Egypt has signed many international projects to fight corruption such as the 
MENA-OECD Task Force on Anti-Bribery, OECD Good Governance for Development 
in Arab Countries Initiative, the Arab Anti-Corruption and Integrity Network (ACINET), 
and the UNDP-POGAR project to support the Ministry of Investment in the fight against 
corruption (OECD, 2009). However, no significant change has happened and a lot still 
needs to be done from the side of the government such as developing a nationwide anti-
corruption strategy. 
                                                 
2  The Open Budget Initiative monitors the availability of seven key budget documents: Pre-Budget 
Statement, Executive’s Budget Proposal, Enacted Budget, In-Year Reports, Mid-Year Reports, Mid-Year 
Review, Year-End Report, and Audit Report. The index also records the presence of Citizens’ Budgets. 
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Against the above background this study seeks to provide a comprehensive index 
of governance and estimate its impact on economic growth. Specifically, this study will 
attempt to answer the following questions: How does economic growth change as the 
comprehensive index of governance changes? Which component of governance is more 
important in explaining variations of economic growth among different countries? How 
these results are interpreted for the MENA region?  
This study is organized as follows: Section II presents the regression model and 
the methodology of the principal component analysis. Section III discusses the data set 
used. Section IV analyzes the estimation results. Section V concludes this study. Section 
VI includes the references. Finally, the appendix appears after Section VI.  
 
II. Empirical Specification 
 
(i) Regression Model  
Following Kaufmann and Kraay (2002), our regression model is presented below: 
 
pgdpi =  + *govi + ei  (1) 
 
Where pgdp is the log per capita income, gov is the governance index, e 
represents all the other factors not included in this parsimonious equation, and finally the 
subscripts i represents the country. The estimate of  will provide information on the 
marginal contribution of improving governance to the per capita gdp growth in the long 
run. 
 
We present the construction of composite governance index (CGI) using the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method in this section. Statisticians and data 
scientists have long adopted this data reduction PCA method in their work. However, it’s 
not popular in economists’ empirical tool bag yet.  
 
(ii) Principal Components Analysis 
Given a data matrix X with p variables and n observations, we can write it as the 
following: 
 
X = ; where i = 1…n, j = 1…p.  (2) 
 
Geometrically, the goal of the PCA is to project the data matrix X from p 
dimensions to a smaller dimension k, where k << p, meanwhile keeping as much 
information (i.e., variance maximization) as possible in this dimension-reduced data 
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matrix with the size n by k3. Specifically, the PCA method replaces a large number of 
correlated variables (X1, … , Xp) with a smaller number of uncorrelated variables 
(Principal Components; PC1, … , PCk).  
 
Mathematically, the first principal component is a linear combination of X1 to Xp 
observed variables that accounts for the largest variance among them: 
 
PC1 = a1X1 + a2X2 + … + apXp  (3) 
 
In equation (3) the vector of coefficient aj (j = 1…p) is termed loading vector and 
is normalized to avoid inflating the variance of PC1. By the same token, the second 
principal component (PC2) is another linear combination of X variables that accounts for 
the largest variance among them, however, with a constraint; PC2 is required to be 
orthogonal to PC1. Theoretically, we are able to track as many principal components as 
the number of variables (p of them) in the data matrix X. But in practice, we search for a 
much smaller number of principal components (PCs) that is able to capture as much as 
information from the original set of X variables. We present the algorithm for deriving 
PCs in the following section. 
 
(ii) Algorithm to derive PCs 
The algorithm to uncover PCs is based on the singular value decomposition (SVD) 
method (I.T. Jolliffe, 2002). While there is no specific rule to select the number of PCs, 
we use four criteria to determine the appropriate number of PCs; they are Kaiser-Harris’s 
stopping rule (criteria), Cattell’s Scree test, Parallel analysis and Percent of cumulative 
variance (see J. Brown, an internet source on this topic). 
 
First, capital letter W is used to denote the variance-covariance matrix. Where W 
is related to data matrix X in the following form; W = 
1n
XX T

, a p*p matrix and the 
superscript “T” is the transpose operator. Since W is a symmetric matrix it can be 
diagonalized as follows: 
 
W = VVT  (4) 
 
In equation (4), V is a matrix of eigenvectors and  is diagonal matrix with the 
eigenvalues. The matrix V is essential in deriving PCs and it’s also termed Principal Axes. 
Apply the SVD method to X and we can obtain the following: 
 
                                                 
3 Two excellent references that cover Principal Components Analysis method are “An Introduction to 
Statistical Learning/ with Applications in R” & “R in Action”. 
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X = UVT  (5) 
 
As mentioned earlier, X is the data matrix with dimension n by p. U and V are 
both orthogonal squared matrix with dimension n and p, respectively.  is diagonal with 
diagonal entries that represent singular values. 
 
There is a relationship between equation (4) and (5), that is: 
 
W = 
1n
XX T

 = 
1n
VUVU TTT

 )()(
 = 
1n
VV T2


 (6) 
 
 
Comparing equation (4) to (6), it can be seen that the square of singular values 
(from ) is actually the eigenvalues derived from the diagonalization of W (or XTX).  
 
Denote the eigenvalues j (j = 1…p). The size of each  to the sum of all s 
accounts for the proportion of variances in the original data matrix X that can be captured 
by the corresponding principal component. If we rearrange  in a descending order from 
1 to p, 1 and the corresponding eigenvector (or first principal component PC1) 
accounts for the largest proportion of variances in X. In practice, correlation of matrix X 
is applied before deriving PCs to avoid scaling problem. To this end, the principal 
components are derived by post-multiplying data matrix X with the principal axes V. 
Alternatively, PCs can also be derived using the following equation:  
 
XV = UVTV = U  (7) 
 
According to equation (7), principal components (PCs) can be obtained using 
either one of the following outcome: 
 
PCs  XV  U  (8) 
 
III. Data 
The cross-sectional data set is obtained from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators covering 188 countries for the years 2009 and 2013, with special focus on 21 
MENA countries4. The reason to choose these two specific years for this study is to make 
a comparison about the governance change before and after the Arab Spring that have 
                                                 
4 There are 22 MENA countries that include Algeria (DZA), Bahrain (BHR), Cyprus (CYP), Djibouti (DJI), 
Egypt (EGY), Iran (IRN), Iraq (IRQ), Israel (ISR), Jordan (JOR), Kuwait (KWT), Lebanon (LBN), Libya 
(LBY), Morocco (MAR), Oman (OMN), Qatar (QAT), Saudi Arabia (SAU), Syria (SYR), Tunisia (TUN), 
Turkey (TUR), United Arab Emirates (ARE), West Bank and Gaza (WBG), and Yemen (YEM). Syria is 
excluded in this study due to missing WGI data. 
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started in Tunisia in 2010. For governance indicators, the Worldwide Governance 
Indicators is used which have been published annually since 1998. The data of the 
Worldwide Governance Indicators is compiled at the World Bank by Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) and Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2005). These indicators 
are based on some 30 opinion and perception-based surveys of various governance 
measures from investment consulting firms, non-government organizations, think tanks, 
governments, and multilateral agencies classified into six dimensions including 
government effectiveness, political stability, control of corruption and regulatory quality, 
voice and accountability, and rule of law5. Data on GDP per capita in 2005 purchasing 
power parity terms is sourced from the World Development Indicators. 
 
IV. Empirical Outcomes & Findings 
 
We first report the loadings of the six principal components and the corresponding 
eigenvalues in Table 1. How many principal components are needed to capture the most 
variances in X? Kaiser–Harris criterion suggests retaining components with eigenvalues 
that are greater than one. In the Cattell Scree test, the eigenvalues s are plotted against 
their component numbers p. If a big bend is revealed, the components above this bend 
will be kept. In Figure 1, the blue line flattens out after the second component which is 
where the bend appears. In the Parallel analysis, a series of s are obtained based on 
simulation. If the eigenvalues obtained from X are greater than the average of simulated 
s, the corresponding principal components are selected. The cross symbols “x” in Figure 
1 represent all the six eigenvalues. The three criteria presented in Figure 1 all indicate the 
first principal component should be selected; the cross symbol at the top left corner. 
While we do not show the percent of cumulative variance graphically, a quick 
computation using the eigenvalues presented at the bottom of Table 1, we can find that 
the first PC explains about 81%6 of variances from the original data set, X. 
 
We transform the original WGIs to a single composite governance index using the 
following computational process: 
 
PC1 = X*L1  (9) 
 
                                                 
5 The detailed definition of each indicator is provided in the appendix. 
6  = 0.8122 or 81.22% 
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CGI = 
)max( 1
1
PC
PC
*100  (10) 
 
In equation (9), it shows that the first principal component is obtained by 
multiplying both data matrix X and the first loading L1 (the first column in red ink in 
Table 1). The Composite Governance Index (CGI) is the PC1 rescaled by dividing the 
largest element in the PC1. The histogram of the CGI is reported in Figure 2. It’s a bit 
skewed to the right. The median index is about -9.7. Our CGI indicates that Finland (FIN) 
has the best governance index that equals 100 and Afghanistan (AFG) has the lowest 
index that equals -88.85 among these 188 countries in our data. Based on the quartiles of 
the CGI, we also report the ranking of governance of these 21 MENA countries in Table 
2. Among these MENA countries, Cyprus has the best governance ranking and Iraq has 
the lowest one.  
 
Using equation (1), we run a regression of the log of per capita GDP on the CGI 
and report the outcome in Table 3.1; the corresponding graphical outcome is presented in 
Figure 3.1. In Table 3.1, due to small p-values, both the t-test and f-test support the 
significance of slope estimate and validity of the model. The slope estimate indicates that 
per capita GDP is going to grow by about 2% (0.0199) if the CGI increases by one unit. 
The multiple or adjusted R2 says that 53% of variation in log of per capita GDP can be 
explained by CGI.  
 
We also conduct another regression that is only based on these 21 MENA 
countries and report the outcome in Table 3.2 and Figure 3.2. It can be seen that the 
estimated slope is 0.01804 that is a bit lower than the estimated slope of 0.0199 from the 
whole sample of 188 countries. While the estimated slopes are similar, we do notice that 
the adjusted R2 drops significantly to 35.9%. 
 
To this end, we make a comparison of the CGI and log of per capita GDP in both 
year 2009 and 2013 and summarize our findings in Table 4. The CGI in 2013 is obtained 
using the same loading we derived in 2009. While we feel disappointed that the 
improvement in CGI doesn’t fully coincide with the economic growth in the MENA 
countries, however, the low adjusted R2 we found earlier may indicate that there are more 
factors that are involved in these countries’ economic growth in addition to the soundness 
of governance. For example, Fig. 3.1 shows that the MENA countries that are way above 
the regression line are mostly oil rich countries. 
 
The results of Table 4 reveal interesting points. Over the period 2009 to 2013, 
only five of the countries in the MENA countries, namely United Arab Emirates, Algeria, 
Iraq, Israel, and West Bank and Gaza, have experienced an improvement in CGI that was 
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accompanied by an enhancement in economic growth. Additionally, over the same period 
only one country in the sample, namely Iran, has experience an improvement in its CGI 
with no change in economic growth. Furthermore, only four countries namely Cyprus, 
Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and Yemen have experienced deterioration in their CGI that was 
also accompanied with lower economic growth over the same period. Finally, or more 
importantly, over the same period about fifty percent of the MENA countries, namely 
Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and 
Turkey have experienced deterioration in the CGI that was accompanied by an increase 
in economic growth. 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
 
There are two main contributions in this paper. The first contribution is that we were able 
to create a “composite governance index” (CGI) that summarizes the existing six 
governance measurements; the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), using the 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The first principal component derived from the 
WGIs accounts for as much as 81% of the variations in the original six WGI 
measurements, which indicates that it can be used as a strong indicator for evaluating 
governments’ managerial ability and effectiveness. The second contribution is that we 
were able to quantify the marginal contribution of improvement in governance on 
economic performance using PPP adjusted constant per capita GDP data. We find that the 
per capita GDP would rise by about 2% if the CGI increases by one unit. Using the Rule 
of 70, the marginal estimate further indicates a mere five-unit improvement in CGI would 
double a country’s per capita GDP in seven years.  
 
Our results suggest that nine countries of the MENA region have shown a positive 
correlation between governance and economic growth which includes those countries that 
have experience deterioration accompanied by deterioration and those countries that have 
experienced an enhancement accompanied by an enhancement in governance index and 
in economic growth, respectively. The relatively low R2 of 35.9% confirms these results. 
More specifically, the CGI explains only 35.9% of the variations in economic growth in 
the MENA region. Our results go in line with the findings of Emara and Jhonsa (2014) 
that the majority of the MENA countries have achieved fragile levels of economic growth 
that does not depend on sound governance.  Our next step in this research is to include 
more control variables in the MENA regression model and we hope that, by doing this, 
we can have a better qualitative prediction outcome on the link between governance and 
growth in this region. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A Governance Indicators and Definitions 
 
1- Voice and 
accountability 
Measured by the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to 
participate in selecting their government as well as freedom of 
expression, association, and the press.  
2- Political stability and 
absence of violence 
Measured by the likelihood that a government will be destabilized by 
unconstitutional or violent means, including terrorism. 
3- Government 
effectiveness 
Measured by the quality of public services, the capacity of civil 
services and their independence from political pressure, and the 
quality of policy formulation.  
4- Regulatory quality Measured by the ability of a government to provide sound policies 
and regulations that enable and promote private sector development. 
5- Rule of law Measured by the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide 
by the rules of society, including the quality of property rights, the 
police and the courts, and the risk of crime. 
6- Control of corruption Measured by the extent to which public power is exercised for private 
gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption as well as 
elite “capture” of the state.  
 
 
Topics in Middle Eastern and African Economies  
Vol. 18, Issue No. 1, May 2016 
140 
 
Figure 1 Principal Component Selection Criteria 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The Distribution of Composite Governance Index 
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Figure 3.1 Linear Regression for All 188 Countries 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Linear Regression for 21 MENA Countries 
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Table 1 Loadings of Principal Components 
 
WGI\Loadings of PCs L1 L2 L3 L4 L5 L6 
Control of Corruption (corr) 0.4303 -0.062 0.2557 -0.6295 0.5808 -0.1095 
Government Effectiveness (ef) 0.431 -0.2729 0.2576 0.0263 -0.2887 0.7677 
Political Stability (ps) 0.3377 0.8773 0.1642 0.2728 0.0836 0.0892 
Regulatory Quality (rq) 0.415 -0.3868 0.0367 0.6964 0.337 -0.2799 
Rule of Law (rl) 0.4424 -0.02 0.1273 -0.1736 -0.6771 -0.5469 
Voice & Accountability (va) 0.3835 0.0454 -0.9076 -0.1167 0.0155 0.1152 
Eigenvalues () 4.8735 0.5509 0.3394 0.1414 0.0493 0.0455 
 
 
Table 2 Ranking According to the Quartiles 
 
Country CGI Rank Country CGI Rank 
ARE 28.10 2 KWT 13.56 2 
BHR 12.67 2 LBN -30.70 3 
CYP 58.25 1 LBY -45.35 4 
DJI -26.30 3 MAR -13.30 3 
DZA -41.87 4 OMN 16.69 2 
EGY -19.85 3 QAT 43.52 1 
IRN -58.69 4 SAU -13.49 3 
IRQ -71.26 4 TUN -3.55 2 
ISR 30.73 2 TUR 0.94 2 
JOR 3.08 2 WBG -34.46 4 
      YEM -59.40 4 
Notes: Rank = 1 if CGI > 35.4, Rank = 2 if -9.7 < CGI  35.4, Rank = 3 if -34.1 < CGI  -9.7, 
Rank = 4 if CGI  -34.1 
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Table 3.1 Impact of GCI on Economic Growth- All Countries 
 
Dependent variable:  Log Per Capita GDP 
Estimation Method: Linear Regression Model 
 
CGI 0.020*** 
(0.001) 
Intercept  9.072*** 
(0.062) 
Countries/Observations 188 
F (1, 186) statistic = 210 p-value: < 2e-16 
R-Squared 0.53 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
 
 
Table 3.2 Impact of GCI on Economic Growth- MENA Countries 
 
Dependent variable:  Log Per Capita GDP 
Estimation Method: Linear Regression Model 
 
CGI 0.018*** 
(0.001) 
Intercept  9.986*** 
(0.186) 
Countries/Observations 21 
F (1, 19) statistic = 12.2 p-value: 0.0024 
R-Squared 0.36 
Notes: ***, ** and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels  
respectively. Numbers in round parentheses (.) are the robust standard errors. 
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Table 4: The Change in CGI and Growth Between the Years 2009 and 2013  
 
Country CGI/09 CGI/13 Improve logY/09 logY/13 Growth 
ARE 28.10 32.26 4.16 11.02 11.02 YES 
BHR 12.67 -2.24 -14.91 10.61 10.64 YES 
CYP 58.25 51.03 -7.22 10.44 10.31 NO 
DJI -26.30 -36.58 -10.27 7.86 7.98 YES 
DZA -41.87 -40.31 1.56 9.44 9.49 YES 
EGY -19.85 -43.65 -23.80 9.19 9.22 YES 
IRN -58.69 -55.06 3.63 9.69 9.66 NO 
IRQ -71.26 -67.17 4.09 9.40 9.63 YES 
ISR 30.73 33.98 3.26 10.26 10.34 YES 
JOR 3.09 -6.42 -9.50 9.33 9.34 YES 
KWT 13.56 -3.35 -16.91 11.29 11.22 NO 
LBN -30.70 -34.57 -3.87 9.66 9.71 YES 
LBY -45.35 -75.04 -29.69 10.24 9.88 NO 
MAR -13.30 -16.00 -2.69 8.74 8.84 YES 
OMN 16.69 6.84 -9.84 10.77 10.57 NO 
QAT 43.52 37.57 -5.95 11.70 11.82 YES 
SAU -13.49 -13.64 -0.14 10.68 10.80 YES 
TUN -3.55 -14.09 -10.54 9.23 9.28 YES 
TUR 0.94 -1.84 -2.78 9.65 9.83 YES 
WBG -34.46 -33.21 1.25 8.34 8.41 YES 
YEM -59.40 -64.84 -5.45 8.38 8.21 NO 
Notes: CGI: composite governance index, Improve = CGI/13 – CGI/09  
logY = natural log of per capita GDP, Growth: whether logY/13 > logY/09 
 
 
 
 
 
 
